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Introduction 
In June of 2005, the relatively small and generally insignificant energy company Unocal became 
the focus of a fierce bidding war. China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) made the 
first move, outbidding the American firm Chevron. Accepting the CNOOC bid looked like an 
obvious choice for Unocal since it was almost $1.5 billion dollars more. However, as it became 
increasingly clear that policy makers in Washington would not allow the deal to go through 
CNOOC withdrew its bid and Unocal had little option but to accept Chevron’s offer. 
 Washington’s opposition seemed to be an overreaction to a deal that would have 
little immediate or long-term impact on U.S. energy supplies. Unocal accounted for less than one 
percent of U.S. oil and gas production. The opposition, however, was the product of larger 
forces. Industry experts and policy makers projected that the world was entering a period of 
fossil fuel scarcity. Holding energy resources was of vital importance for energy security and 
national survival. American policy makers found the deal unacceptable. China had a comparable 
energy demand and deficit. China would likely divert energy products away from the United 
States and towards itself. Many observers thought that this would be the beginning of what 
would be a long, drawn-out battle between the two countries over the world’s fossil fuel 
resources. This competition, many believed, would unavoidably strain resources, and scholars 
such as Michael Klare predicted it would eventually end in war.1 
 In 2005, few would have predicted that the U.S. and China would soon cooperate in the 
development of energy resources located in the United States. This, however, is what transpired. 
In 2010, the U.S. allowed a Chinese company to invest in its domestic energy resources.  
CNOOC, the company that five years earlier had their attempt to invest in 
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  Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
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American energy assets blocked, reached a deal with Chesapeake Energy to help develop 
and produce shale gas reserves in the Eagle Ford formation in Texas. In 2011, these two 
companies reached an agreement to develop shale resources in Colorado and Wyoming. A little 
less than a year later, the Chinese firm Sinopec and the American firm Devon Energy also 
entered into a joint venture. CNOOC and Sinopec are also currently in competition to buy a 30 
percent stake in FTS international, a company that specializes in hydraulic fracturing 
technology.2  
 Why would U.S. policy makers allow Chinese investment in 2010? This question 
becomes especially perplexing when taking into consideration that the energy demand for both 
countries grew during this time, and projections of energy scarcity have persisted. While the 
shale gas boom has given US policy makers reason for optimism, the amount of gas in the 
ground or how long it will supply U.S. demand is far from certain. I will offer an explanation for 
this puzzle by applying the theory outlined by Stephen Brooks in his book Producing Security. I 
will use his theory to create a typology that explains when US policy makers support cooperation 
and when they do not. I will argue that the United States can no longer seek to obtain energy 
security independently, or to limit investment only to close allies who pose no threat to energy 
supplies. High costs and rapid technological development have forced the United States 
to allow for investment from China, an energy competitor. The United States, however, does not 
indiscriminately allow for Chinese investment but will only do so when 
the investment will enable technological innovation and provide needed capital that 
will further ensure energy security. 
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  Chris V Nicholson, “Cnooc in $2.2 Billion With Chesapeake Energy,” New York Times, October 11, 2010; Leslie 
Hook, “Cnooc Strikes Second US Shale Deal,” Financial Times, January 31, 2011 ; Dinny McMahon and Chester 
Yung, “China’s Bid in Fracking,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2011.	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 This paper will continue as follows: I will first provide a review of the relevant literature. 
I will then offer the theoretical foundations of my argument. I will then give the relevant 
background information. This will include a brief explanation of natural gas exploration 
and production as well as a short historical outline of the U.S.-China energy relationship. I will 
then test two case studies against the hypotheses that I will pose later in this paper. The 
first case will provide an in-depth examination of the previous attempt of CNOOC to buy a stake 
in American-held energy assets in 2005. This incident will help provide a baseline of the 
behavior of energy-deficit states when energy is scarce, or there are projections of scarcity, and 
there is no pressing need for technological innovation to produce fossil fuel economically. 
The second case study, U.S.-Chinese shale gas cooperation, will show the response of the United 
States when projects are technologically and capital intensive.  
Reviewing the Literature 
There is a considerable body of literature on the role that energy has played in the 
often rocky U.S.-China relationship. Literature on this subject has dramatically grown 
since CNOOC’s failed bid for Unocal in 2005. While there has been some diversity in the 
literature, it has largely fallen into Liberal and Realist camps. The Realists see increased demand, 
shrinking supplies, and limited resource availability leading to increased levels of protectionism 
and conflict. The Liberals take the approach that the existing institutions and markets will, if they 
have not already, encourage U.S. and Chinese firms to seek increasing levels of cooperation.  
Realists, who see the issue of fossil fuel resources leading to increased conflict between 
the United States and China, have produced a significant body of work.3 Those within 
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  The Realist argument is best represented by: Brock Tessman and Wojtek Wolfe, “Great Power and Strategic 
Hedging,” International Studies Review 13, no. 2 (June 2011); Michael Klare, Rising Powers Shrinking Planet (New 
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this group vary somewhat in their argument, but they agree on a few key points about the nature 
of the nexus between energy and U.S.-Chinese relations. These scholars argue that it is China’s 
national interest to aggressively seek energy resources around the globe. The United States views 
China's behavior as a threat to its energy security. Policy makers, they go on to argue, 
largely see the acquisition of fossil fuels as a zero-sum game, or that the gain of another energy-
deficit country comes at the expense of one’s own energy security. Because of this, the United 
States has sought to protect its current possessions and block further Chinese acquisition. In 
doing so the United States has not adhered to institutions and treaties, such as the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) and the Energy Charter Treaty. These treaties and institutions are designed 
to limit great power conflict over energy resources, but under conditions of scarcity are 
detrimental to achieving energy security. 
While the Realists’ argument accurately explained the behavior of the two nations in the 
four years following the demand shock of 2004, they have been unable to explain the sudden 
change in behavior towards cooperation in 2008 and 2009. If the logic of the 
Realist argument were to be followed, it should be expected that considerable efforts would be 
made to protect new found shale gas assets from foreign investment and possible control. This 
has not transpired. As domestic resources have become more abundant, the United States has 
increasingly opened its borders to Chinese investment. 
 The Liberal argument is that institutional forces have kept, and will continue to keep, 
Chinese behavior within certain bounds. This group argues that the knowledge that Chinese 
behavior has increasingly conformed to the guidelines set by institutions, such as international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
York: Metropolitan Books, 2008); Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001); Ingolf Kiesow, ”The Global Race for Oil and Gas: Power Politics and 
Principles in Asia,” Institute for Development and Security Studies (October 2008);  John B. Alterman and John W. 
Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East (Washington D.C.:CSIS Press, 2008).	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stock exchanges, has increased trust among U.S. policy makers toward China.4 Those who argue 
along these lines have pointed to moves such as the listing of China’s energy firms on the New 
York and Hong Kong stock exchanges, closer observance of the guidelines set by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), and the ability of the energy market to make mercantilist 
behavior economically irrational, as evidence of their claims. Instances such as CNOOC’s failure 
to purchase Unocal in 2005, this group argues, are the product of nationalism and domestic 
politics rather than attempts to achieve or maintain energy security. This group further argues 
that recent moves toward energy cooperation between the United States and China can be 
explained best by market forces.   
The scholars in this camp accurately point to increased cooperation between the United 
States and China since 2005, yet their explanations have fallen short of providing a compelling 
explanation for the change in U.S. policy. Liberals discount the view of U.S. policy makers 
toward China’s investment for most of the 2000s. Policy makers saw energy acquisition as a zero 
sum game in the years directly following the demand shock of 2004. China’s growing energy 
demand and aggressive investment strategy were a serious threat to energy security. Further, 
institutions and markets have not constrained Chinese aggression in the acquisition of resources. 
Since 2005, China has continued to practice the same investment strategy5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
4	  This Liberal argument is best represented by the following works: Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and 
the Remaking of the Modern World (New York: Penguin Press, 2011);  Robin M. Mills, The Myth of The Oil Crisis: 
Overcoming the Challenge of Depletion, Geopolitics, and Global Warming (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, 
2008); Edward S. Stienfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise doesn’t Threaten the West (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) Eugene Gohlz and Daryl G. Press, “Energy Alarmism: The Myths that Make Americans 
Worry about Oil,” Policy Analysis: Cato Institute, no. 589 (April 2007); Andrei Konoplyanik and Thomas Walde, 
“Energy Charter Treaty and its Role in International Energy.” Journal of Energy and Natural Resource Law 24, no. 
4 (December 2006). 
5	  Cyrus Sanati, “Stockpile of Dollars Drives China’s Energy Strategy,” New York Times Oct 1, 2010; Indira Campos 
and Alex Vines, “Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(March 2008) , 9-11; International Energy Agency, 2011 World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2011): 159-161.	  
6	  
	  
 My research will provide an alternate explanation, borrowing from both Neoliberal and 
Realist theories, for the increased tendency toward cooperation between the United States and 
China. It will be based on the assumptions made by Stephen Brooks in his book Producing 
Security. In Producing Security, Brooks lays out a theoretical argument for the analysis of the 
security implications of the globalization of production. He demonstrates that globalization has 
changed the relationship between leading international companies. These changes have 
dramatically shifted the incentives involved in the relationships between major powers away 
from conquest and towards cooperation and economic integration. The most consequential of 
these changes has been the incentive to abandon autarkic defense production. 
 Brooks argues there has been a dramatic shift among advanced nations away from 
autarkic defense production and towards internationalization, collaboration, and inter-firm 
manufacturing. Brooks notes that this recent cooperation is in spite of the fact that states desire to 
continue to produce defense systems domestically. This insight is counterintuitive since there are 
a number of compelling tactical reasons for desiring domestic defense production. Any deviation 
from domestic production, therefore, would have to be the product of a compelling security 
necessity. Brooks provides a convincing answer to this puzzle through his analysis of advanced 
technology in the defense industry. What he found was that the high costs of research and 
development, along with rapid improvements in technology, have made autarkic production 
irrational. This is due to the increased reliance firms have on inter-firm cooperation. The 
advantages of inter-firm alliances include unique competencies, reductions in redundancies, the 
advantage of economies of scale, and the ability to share prohibitively high research and 
development costs. This has allowed firms to make more complicated and cheaper defense 
systems.  Because of the geographic diversity of leading technology firms, firms have 
7	  
	  
disregarded international borders in their search for partnerships in order to produce improved 
defense systems. 
 In this research, I will apply this model, with a few modifications, to the energy industry. 
I will test it against two case studies to see if it offers an explanation for recent U.S-Chinese 
shale gas cooperation. The question that this research will attempt to answer is: Have the costs 
within energy production shifted so that if the United States closes itself off to foreign investment 
it will be unable to maximize energy production and its energy firms will be unable to continue 
to develop cutting-edge energy production technology? In order to create a framework that will 
answer this question, this research will operate under a number of assumptions of state and firm 
behavior. These assumptions of state and firm behavior share some of the same traits as those 
provided by Brooks.6 As with Brooks’ analysis, I will assume that when a state chooses to allow 
foreign investment in its domestic energy resources, it will only do so if the benefits of foreign 
investment significantly outweigh the costs. I will further argue that energy resources are a 
strategic national interest. As such, nations will prefer autarkic energy production, or if that is not 
possible, to limit investment in such resources to close allies. More specifically, I will argue that 
the U.S. has changed its position with regard to Chinese energy investment because the benefits 
of added energy security that come with increased technological research and development made 
possible by Chinese investment and cooperation have significantly come to outweigh the benefits 
of autarkic production. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
6	  It is important to note, that unlike weapons and weapons systems, fossil fuels are a finite natural resource. Further, 
fossil fuels can only be produced to the point that the resources are in the ground and only at the rate that production 
technology will allow.	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Hypothesis 
H1: For an energy project, if technological intensity and capital intensity are high, it is likely 
U.S. policy makers will support cooperation and allow for foreign investment. 
H 2: For an energy project, if technological intensity and capital intensity are low, it is not likely 
U.S. policy makers will support cooperation and allow foreign investment.   
Dependent Variable: U.S. - Chinese cooperation  
Independent variable #1: Technological intensity 
Independent variable #2: Capital intensity 
Definition of Technology: Any new or improved product, process, or technique that enhances the 
overall result compared with the result observed today.7 
 I will test the hypothesis against two cases. The first case will be the attempted purchase 
of Unocal by CNOOC. The second case will be U.S.-China shale gas cooperation that began in 
2010. These are the best cases to test the hypothesis. The first case will set a baseline of the 
expected behavior of states. The expected behavior of states under conditions of scarcity, or 
projections of such, is to resort to mercantilism. The second case is also an excellent test of the 
hypothesis. There is little reason to expect the United States to abandon protective policies 
towards Chinese investment without the inclusion of the independent variables, technology and 
capital intensity. Both the United States and China have, and continue to face, large energy 
deficits. Most Realists would argue that such a condition should lead the two states away from 
cooperation and toward increased levels of protectionism and conflict. This has not transpired. 
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  National Petroleum Council, “Topic Paper #29 Unconventional Gas,” NPC Global Oil and Gas Study (July 
2007):35-36.	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Both the United States and China have the potential to secure long-term natural gas security 
contingent on the continued technological innovation needed to extract unconventional shale gas. 
As it has become more economically viable to produce shale gas, it has been increasingly 
beneficial for U.S. and Chinese firms to seek inter-firm collaboration to extract resources. 
Importantly, for this research, U.S. policy makers have also found it within the interest of U.S. 
energy security to allow for such investment. 
There are a number of differences between the two cases used for this study. The two 
crucial differences in these cases offer two alternate variables that could explain the change in 
U.S. policy. The most important of these differences is the nature of the investment. In the first 
case, CNOOC attempted to purchase Unocal while, in the second case, the Chinese firms bought 
shares of U.S. shale assets. It could be argued that this difference is the variable responsible for 
the change in U.S. policy. This explanation is lacking. Any foreign investment by a competitor 
that is not a net benefit to U.S. energy security will not be permitted. Since U.S. companies 
primarily drilled for conventional gas prior to 2005, their projects were not comparatively 
capital- and technology intensive. Further, it can be expected that if an investment similar to that 
attempted by CNOOC in 2005 was to be attempted today it would only be allowed if the benefits 
to U.S. energy security significantly outweighed the costs. It is also expected that if a Chinese 
firm were to attempt to purchase a share in a project, in 2005 or presently, that was not 
technology and capital intensive, it would be blocked.  
Different policy makers between the cases could also be offered as an explanation for the 
change. The model used for this research assumes rationality. Policy makers do a cost-benefit 
analysis when deciding to allow or block foreign energy investment. While there has been some 
variability in U.S. energy policy since the demand shock of 2004, it has been fairly consistent 
10	  
	  
across both major parties.8 This consistency is evidenced by the nearly unanimous opposition by 
the House of Representatives to the Unocal-CNOOC deal in 2005, bipartisan support for the 
energy bills of 2005 and 2007, and the lack of opposition from policy makers of both parties 
toward Chinese investment in U.S. shale gas. Further, it should also be the case that energy 
resources directly affecting U.S. energy security, like the Canadian tar sands, continue to be seen 
as a zero-sum game. The United States has put considerable pressure on Canadian policy makers 
to block Chinese investment. The United States has attempted to ensure that future energy supply 
from these resources goes to the United States and not to China, although domestic politics are 
stalling the proposed Keystone pipeline.9  
 If the hypothesis is correct, after the introduction of the independent variables we can 
expect to see a number of outcomes. It should be shown that there is a significant need for 
continued technological development. Further, it should also be the case that U.S. energy 
companies find it difficult to independently raise the requisite capital for technological 
development. It should also be expected that firms will meet capital demands by increasing the 
quantity and quality of inter-firm partnerships between US and Chinese companies. If the 
hypothesis is correct, then increased cooperation on issues of energy extraction between the 
United States and Chinese policy makers should be expected. Along with this cooperation there 
should be a willingness by policy makers within the United States to allow foreign investment in 
energy assets. If the hypothesis is not correct, in cases where high levels of technology and 
capital are needed, cooperation between the United States and China should not be expected. In 
this case, inter-firm partnerships between Chinese and American companies are not likely. 
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  It should be noted, that while parties’ policy choices have remained consistent, the parties’ rhetoric has, at times, 
diverged.	  
9	  Jeremy Martin, “U.S. must Consider Energy Security in Canadian Oil Debate,” World Politics Review, September 
27, 2011.	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Theoretical Foundations 
The Behavior of the State  
States view fossil fuels as a strategic asset for both economic and military reasons. Fossil fuels 
provide energy for transportation, production of electricity, industry, heating of buildings, and 
modern militaries. A nation will prefer to produce fossil fuels domestically and rely on foreign 
sources and investment as little as possible.10 Although energy independence is the ideal, the 
reality for most industrialized states lies somewhere between independent production and heavy 
reliance on foreign energy sources. Since energy independence is unrealistic for most states, they 
instead seek energy security. 
The term energy security is difficult to define. Daniel Yergin, however, has provided a 
popular and widely accepted definition: the state’s ability to ensure an adequate supply at a 
reasonable price.11 This definition is adequate under normal conditions but needs to be expanded 
to explain state behavior under conditions of scarcity and projected scarcity. Under such 
conditions, states will seek adequate supply to meet their demands, but possession of resources is 
more important than price. Since domestic supply is the most secure, it should be expected that a 
state will aggressively guard domestic resources in order to limit reliance on imports.12 The 
addition that this research will seek to make is that states will allow for investment in energy 
assets by a competitor if the investment has the potential to increase future supply.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
10	  Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), 
115-117.	  
11	  Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, 70-71. 
12 Theodore Tsakiris, “Energy Security as Economic Statecraft: a Concise Historical Overview of the Last 100 
Years,” Agora Without Frontiers 9, no. 4 (2004):307-329. 	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 The ideal condition for policy makers of most nations is that supply adequately meets 
current demand as well as projections of future needs. Under such conditions price and 
distribution are the paramount concerns of policy makers. Policy makers have significant 
incentive to secure energy resources at the lowest prices possible. Increases in the cost of energy 
can create serious economic and political problems. Consumers spend money on energy they 
would have otherwise spent on consumer goods, if prices were lower. The prices of 
transportation and production also go up as energy for the production of manufactured goods 
becomes more expensive. In the long-term, if dramatic increases in price go unchecked, the 
economy will likely shrink, and consumer buying power will diminish. This scenario could have 
significant political ramifications. Reelection would be unlikely for a leader in a democratic 
system.13 Policy makers have an incentive to keep energy prices low. This is achieved by 
ensuring that energy production and imports will be able to meet current and projected demand 
while also ensuring spare capacity. 
Under the scenario of fossil fuel scarcity, or projections of scarcity, the behavior of 
energy deficit states will shift dramatically.	  Energy resource acquisition is a zero-sum game; 
under conditions of scarcity one state’s gain is another state’s loss. States with a large energy 
deficit will aggressively guard their domestic reserves as well as the relationships and energy 
contracts made with foreign energy producing nations. Energy-deficit states will most 
aggressively guard these assets against other deficit states.14  
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  U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Economic Effects of High Oil Prices,” Issues in Focus, 2006.	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Energy-Producing Firms and the State 
 Policy makers have substantial incentives to ensure that their nations have adequate energy 
supply. Energy-producing firms are the instruments policy makers use to achieve energy 
objectives. To ensure the proper management of fossil fuel production, many nations have 
nationalized firms within their borders.	  This is not the case in the United States. The United 
States government has no direct control over the companies within its borders, but policy makers 
are able to exert a considerable degree of indirect control. This influence has historically taken 
the form of tax breaks, financial incentives, research and development funding, military 
protection, and aggressive diplomacy for more open access to a producing nation’s reserves.15   
The relationship between Chinese firms and their government is somewhat different. 
These firms are a hybrid of state and private ownership with a majority stake held by the central 
government. Chinese firms receive direct mandates from the central government. These 
mandates, however, are often vague and meant to direct the firms towards general goals and not 
dictate day-to-day operations or business operations, which few policy makers have the expertise 
to understand.16 
Under conditions, or projections, of future scarcity states will push for or mandate the 
expansion of capabilities and output of the firms under their control. Since dramatically 
increased production in a country with an energy deficit is often not a realistic goal, these firms 
must aggressively seek sources outside their borders in order to meet their government’s wishes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
15 U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005, HR 6, 109th Cong., 1st sess.,(August 8, 2005); U.S. Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007, HR 6, 110th Cong., 1st sess., (January 12, 2007).	  
16 Yuanyuan Ding, “The Party, the Oil Companies, and Energy Security: Who Determines Chinese Policy?” 
(Master’s Thesis, Georgia State University, 2008). 
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Nations, under this scenario, will use diplomacy on behalf of such firms since these assets are 
likely to be contested by multiple deficit nations, and gaining access will be difficult.  
Behavior of Energy-Producing Firms 
An energy-producing firm’s main incentive is to make a profit. Firms make profits by possessing 
energy resources and extracting product out of these resources at an economically viable rate. As 
societies have continued to use fossil fuels, these fuels have become increasingly difficult to 
extract. Continued expansions in production require both large amounts of capital investment, as 
well as increasing levels of technological development and skill.17  
Capital Investment 
Attempts at fossil fuel extraction are expensive and risky. Although technology has helped to 
mitigate some of the risk associated with drilling for fossil fuels, any company that undertakes 
fossil fuel extraction faces serious financial risks.  Firms risk being unable to locate resources, or 
not finding the requisite amount for economic production. The technology to find and produce 
fossil fuels has also become increasingly expensive to develop and operate. Along with the costs 
associated with technology and extraction are a number of associated costs. These costs include 
elements outside of direct production such as government taxes, royalties, and transportation. 
Few companies, especially smaller independents, have the capital to take on the high costs and 
risks of fossil fuel exploration and production by themselves. To counter this, they seek outside 
sources of capital.18 
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 Energy companies raise money either through loan capital (debt) or shareholders (equity). 
Equity capital within the energy industry often consists of joint ventures between two or more 
energy-producing firms. Companies enter inter-firm alliances with strict agreements about 
capital investment, profit sharing, and the role that each company plays in the fossil fuel 
extraction process.19 
Technology  
The technology to extract hydrocarbon resources has become increasingly complicated and 
complex. The need to extract from increasingly difficult formations and locations has been the 
driver for much of the increased complexity in extraction technology. This puts energy- 
producing firms and nations in a difficult position. Technological innovation is extremely 
expensive, but as technological capacity increases so does production. A significant increase in 
production will have the effect of depressing the market price of fossil fuels, making it less likely 
that a company will recover its research and development costs. However, if a firm were to 
decide to forgo technological development, it would soon find its technology obsolete, making it 
unable to produce its product at an effective price. Firms can meet these challenges by entering 
into inter-firm alliances.20    
Along with other advances in technology, the skill of the firm’s employees in drilling, 
hydraulic fracturing, and operations will have a significant impact on the production output of 
any given well. Acquiring the techniques and skill to develop a successful method of extraction 
is a complicated process. This process takes years to develop, and many attempts to master. This 
experience, like technological innovation, comes at a price few companies can take on alone. As 
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20 Ibid. 
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with technical advances, firms will also meet the difficulties presented by developing drilling 
techniques with increased inter-firm cooperation.21  
Inter-firm Cooperation 
Inter-firm alliances are short-term ventures that allow for benefits that would not be realized if 
the firms chose not to cooperate. Energy firms choose to engage in inter-firm alliances for the 
same reasons that companies in other high entry cost industries choose to do so. In order to stay 
competitive, as technology continues to advance, firms must adapt and innovate. This process is 
knowledge intensive, capital intensive, and risky.22	  Inter-firm alliances provide firms with the 
ability to increase the pace and scope of research and development, reduce costs, and 
significantly mitigate risks since the resources going towards the effort represent contributions 
from both partners.23 
Background 
Natural Gas Conventional and Unconventional and Its Uses 
Natural gas is the end product of a process that usually takes millions of years to complete. 
Natural gas is made of decomposing plant and animal life that became buried before it was able 
to fully decompose. Over millions of years, layer upon layer of sediment, mud, and sand covered 
these organisms. These layers prevented the normal oxidation process and impeded the process 
of decay that organic matter usually undergoes. Over time, these layers of sediment became 
compacted into rock formations. Over the span of millions of years, the weight of these rock 
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22 ibid 
23 Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus 
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17	  
	  
formations as well as the earth’s heat turned these trapped organisms into natural gas buried deep 
below the earth’s surface.24 
 Natural gas comes in two forms. There is associated natural gas, which formed in 
conjunction with oil, and nonassociated gas, which formed independently of oil. During 
production, associated gas is a secondary product in the search for more valuable oil, while 
nonassociated gas is the primary product. Both associated and nonassociated gas can be found in 
a wide variety of locations and geological formations. Both types are found in geologic 
formations that are considered either conventional or unconventional. The classifications of 
conventional and unconventional resources are particularly relevant for the purposes of this 
paper. Conventional natural gas is found in well-defined and permeable rock formations. Gas 
distributed around a large area where permeability is low is unconventional gas. However, the 
most salient distinction between conventional and unconventional resources is the level of 
technology needed for economical production.	  Unconventional gas resources are shale gas, tight 
gas sands, coal bed methane, and methane hydrates. These resources require higher levels of 
technology and cannot usually be economically extracted with the use of vertical wells. The 
technology needed for economic extraction makes unconventional resources much more 
expensive than conventional resources to extract.25	   
Natural Gas in the Energy Equation 
Natural gas has a wider variety of worldwide uses than any other fossil fuel.	  Gas’s share of the 
energy market has grown significantly, and its growth will continue as its use expands. Natural 
gas comprises twenty-four percent of worldwide energy consumption and is crucial to a number 
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of segments of leading economies. In the United States, natural gas produces forty percent of the 
energy demanded by industrial production, eighteen percent of electricity production, seventy 
percent of the fuel consumed to heat homes and stores, and three percent of the fuel consumed 
for transportation.26 
             In light of the important role of natural gas in the energy equation, securing this resource 
is vital for energy security. Although natural gas is not at the forefront of public discussion, 
securing access to this vital resource is at the forefront of policy makers’ agendas. In the United 
States, promotion of increased domestic natural gas production has been the target of a number 
of pieces of legislation stretching back to 1980s. The first piece of legislation was Section 29 of 
the Windfall Tax Bill of 1982. The object of this bill was to provide incentives for the 
exploration and production of unconventional natural gas resources. Without these incentives, 
there would have been few attempts to extract unconventional resources since they would not 
have been economical.27 Natural gas was also the target of key pieces of the 2005 Energy Policy 
Act, the 2007 Energy Security and Independence Act, and the energy policies put in place by the 
Obama administration.28  
U.S. Natural Gas Scarcity 
At the turn of the 21st century, there was considerable concern that the United States would soon 
become a net importer of natural gas. This scenario would be extremely costly. Because natural 
gas comes out of the ground in gas form, it is extremely costly to ship across oceans. A problem 
once thought to be a distant threat became immediate and real as U.S. natural gas consumption 
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  Yergin, the Quest, 326-27 
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dramatically grew throughout the 1990s. This increase was largely due to a major shift in the 
production of electricity. Power plants operators started to move away from the use of coal and 
oil and towards natural gas. At the time producers of electricity were making this switch there 
was little fear that natural gas would become scarce, or that prices would significantly increase. 
However, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s U.S. producers of gas found that they were able 
to produce and find less natural gas. This became a concern for both producers of gas and 
electricity, as well as policy makers. Policy makers knew that if the price of gas were to increase 
due to expensive imports then consumers would be faced with higher utility and heating costs.29  
Nearly all energy agencies predicted that the United States would soon face a gas deficit. 
The IEA predicted in 2003 that the United States would not be able to sustain consumption at the 
2002 rate (Table 1). If the United States continued these levels of consumption, then by 2010 it 
would be forced to import large amounts of natural gas. Demand was growing at a rate of two 
percent a year, while production was growing at a rate of only one percent. The picture for 
Canada’s production output, which had made up for the United States’ twenty percent deficit, 
would not grow fast enough to meet the U.S.’ increasing demand.  
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Table 1. Projections of U.S. Natural Gas Consumption. 
source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2004 
 
As can be seen from the data presented in Table 1, the projections provided by the IEA gave the 
United States considerable reason to be concerned about its ability to provide for its short-and 
long-term needs.  
Projections of scarcity encouraged energy companies to devote large amounts of capital 
toward the infrastructure needed to produce, store, and ship vast amounts of natural gas.30 
Natural gas is ideally transported over long distances in pipelines. In order for natural gas to be 
shipped across an ocean, it must be changed from a gaseous state into a liquid (LNG). Liquefied 
natural gas is made by cooling gas to the point where it becomes liquid (-260°F). This liquid is 
then pumped into specially designed ships that can maintain this temperature for extended 
periods.31 This is an extremely complex and difficult process. It is also extremely expensive, but 
necessary, in order to meet future import needs of large deficit countries like the United States 
and China. The large scale investment needed for infrastructure and production of LNG was not 
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Independent energy companies are only involved in the extraction of energy products. 
31Shively  and Ferarre, Understanding Today’s Natural Gas Business, 11; MIT, “The Future of Natural Gas,” 35.  
Year 2003 2010 2025 
 Consumption	     
 22.0 26.2 31.4 
  
 Supply	     
Lower 48 18.6 19.9 21.3 
Alaska .5 .6 2.7 
Canada   3.5 3.7 2.6 
Mexico -.6 -.3 -.1 
LNG .4 2.2 4.8 
Other    
Total 22.4 26.2 31.4 
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the United States’ sole concern. There were also serious concerns about the geographic locations 
of many of the large natural gas reserves. Not only were many of these reserves in distant 
countries, but many were countries with which the United States had rocky relationships. Policy 
makers feared natural gas would now face many of the same security and price issues as oil. 
These included issues such as transport and security, and increased competition with China.32  
Growing Chinese Demand for Natural Gas 
The demand for natural gas in China has grown rapidly. This increase stems from two sources. 
Chinese policy makers need to provide energy for rapid industrial growth. They also desire to 
curb the environmental damage done by the use of coal for heating homes and producing 
electricity.33 These forces have dramatically increased demand for natural gas and strained 
domestic resources, which are limited and underdeveloped.   
Although in 2005 Chinese demand for natural gas resources had not yet outstripped 
production, it was assumed that it soon would. Chinese policy makers would soon be faced with 
severe shortages. These shortages had the potential to damage economic development and slow 
the pace of further modernization. In 2004, China imported its first significant quantities of 
LNG, a trend that has continued and grown (Table 2).  At present, the natural gas deficit has 
forced China to import large amounts of LNG to meet domestic demand.34 Chinese energy firms 
have aggressively sought natural gas reserves to make up for this deficit. In 2004 alone, Chinese 
firms signed long term deals for LNG imports from an Australian gas producer, the Iranian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
32 Yergin, the Quest, pgs. 312-316..  
33 Duan Zhaofang, ”China’s Natural Gas Market Outlook,” The 4th CNPC/IEEJ Press Conference of Oil (December 
10, 2010).	  
34	  	   Duan Zhaofang, ”China’s Natural Gas Market Outlook,” The 4th CNPC/IEEJ Press Conference of Oil 
(December 10, 2010);	  IEA,	  “Natural Gas Market Outlook,”139-142. 
22	  
	  
National Oil Company, and various gas-producing African nations. The Chinese also began to 
pursue natural gas deals in the central Asian country of Kazakhstan.35.  
Table 2. Chinese Natural Gas Imports    
Year  Chinese LNG Imports (tons) 
2003 0 
2004 483 
2005 483 
2006 687,543 
2007 2,913,122 
2007 3,336,000 
Source: Gas in China  
 
The Chinese government’s global search for natural gas security led them on a collision 
course with the United States. U.S. and Chinese firms were aggressively going after the same gas 
resources at various locations around the world.  
Case #1: CNOOC- Unocal 
The Unocal-CNOOC case began in late 2004. CNOOC had expressed some early interest in 
Unocal, but quickly dropped out due to fears of taking on too high a debt burden. At this point 
Chevron, a large American energy firm, offered a bid that the board of Unocal deemed to be too 
low. In response, Unocal’s board informed CNOOC of Chevron’s unacceptable offer and asked 
if they would be willing to reconsider and make a counter offer. Unocal’s board also told 
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Chevron that they would entertain Chevron’s offer if it was increased. Chevron jumped at the 
second chance and was the first to offer a new bid of $16.5 billion. A few weeks later this bid 
would be outdone by CNOOC, which made an unexpected all cash-offer of $18.5 billion.  
The misconception in the general public, and in some of the articles put out by the press, 
was that CNOOC wanted to acquire Unocal for its oil assets. This was not the case. Unocal was a 
minor player in the oil industry, but held large reserves of natural gas. Natural gas made up sixty 
percent of the company’s assets. Unocal’s reserves were located throughout the world, but most 
were in Southeast Asia.36 The geographic location of these assets is what made them appealing to 
both firms. Both firms thought that Unocal’s LNG technology and reserves would be a valuable 
addition to their portfolio. Both firms also wanted to increase their share of the Chinese market.37 
Chevron, however, had a number of domestic reasons for wanting to acquire Unocal. If natural 
gas supplies in the United States became more constrained, it would have the facilities and 
capabilities in place to begin importing LNG from production points in Southeast Asia.38 The 
possibility of allowing a reliable source of future LNG imports to be bought by a company from 
China presented too much risk for policy makers.  
Although there was some incentive for cooperation between U.S. and Chinese 
companies, this incentive outweighed the energy needs of the firms’ home country. Holding 
assets currently under development is more likely to lead to energy security than developing 
technology that may have uncertain results. Also, importantly, there was little need for an 
American company to seek or want Chinese capital. Since these thresholds are not met, 
cooperation is not expected 
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  David R. Baker, “Chevron Completes Unocal Deal: Purchase Spells the End of 115 Year Old Company,” San 
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37 Steinfeld, Playing Our Game, 201-204. 
38 Klare, Rising Powers Shrinking Planet, 4-5.	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Technology and Investment 
In 2005, Unocal was a company with a checkered past. The company, although spending billions 
in capital throughout the early 2000s, was unable to make any significant finds. Through 2004, 
both production and reserves had steadily declined. By 2005, many of the firm’s fields that were 
not already under production or online for production were considered marginal. Although this 
was the case, the company remained profitable due to the rising prices of oil and gas. In 2004, 
the company recorded a record profit of $1.21 billion, nearly double their previous record from 
the year before of $643 million. Unocal’s profits and large reserves were an easy way for 
CNOOC and Chevron to increase natural gas reserves and profit margin. In 2005, with limited 
exploration, guaranteed production and proven reserves were exceedingly lucrative. 39 
  Many energy-producing companies believed that purchasing assets, like those held by 
Unocal, would be cheaper than hiring the work force, developing the technology, and taking the 
risk in capital that large-scale exploration projects demanded. 40 Even if firms had wanted to take 
on serious exploration efforts they would have been extremely limited in their ability to do so. 
Many large firms had long-term financial obligations and had a limited numbers of workers 
skilled in fossil fuel exploration. 41 It was for these reasons that Chevron and CNOOC wanted to 
acquire Unocal.42 
 Under the scenario described above, there was little need for technological development 
or cooperation. Unocal’s assets had largely been developed with existing technology. Further, 
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Unocal was a possessor of conventional assets that did not require advanced drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing technology to extract. The unconventional resources that they did hold, 
mainly deepwater sites in Asia and the Gulf of Mexico, were already producing or near 
production.43  
  If current reserves are not sufficient to meet a nation’s demand, then energy firms are 
encouraged by their governments to grow their reserves and production. Firms achieve this 
through acquisition of other energy producing companies. These firms will ideally have 
attractive assets, usually already under production or beyond the early stages of exploration.44 
Although prior to CNOOC’s attempted purchase of Unocal in 2005 there had been limited 
cooperation between Chinese and U.S. companies, this cooperation was mainly for large projects 
that were in lands foreign to both firms, notably pipeline projects in Central Asia and a couple of 
offshore projects. These projects were not within the U.S. borders, and the intentions of these 
projects posed no threat to U.S. energy security. The intention of these projects was for more 
effective transport of China’s existing assets. However, CNOOC’s attempted purchase of Unocal 
was a perceived threat to U.S. energy security. If an investment poses a threat to energy security, 
policy makers will not allow it. A state will only cooperate with a foreign energy competitor 
when the benefits significantly outweigh the costs. In this case, the benefits did not outweigh the 
costs. CNOOC’s investment does not meet the threshold set out by this model. The expected 
outcome is mercantilist behavior from American policy makers.  
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Political Opposition to CNOOC’s Investment 
Soon after the announcement of the proposed CNOOC-Unocal deal it faced strong opposition 
from U.S. policy makers. This opposition stemmed from a number of concerns. These concerns 
included questions about Chinese intentions and the increasing trade deficit. At the forefront, 
however, was that with nothing to balance the loss of Unocal, CNOOC’s acquisition was a 
Chinese gain and an American loss.  
The day after the deal became public knowledge, two congressmen wrote to President 
Bush urging him to conduct a full ninety day review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS).45 CFIUS is an organization that has considerable influence on foreign 
direct investment in the United States.  If the CFIUS board gives an unfavorable review judging 
that the acquisition threatens national security, it is likely that the executive will block the 
investment.46 Up until 2005, the president had only blocked one deal of the thousands that had 
gone under review. CFIUS had done thousands of reviews, but none of them had dealt with the 
transfer of energy products. However, until 2005 U.S. energy supplies had never been threatened 
by another energy-deficit country. 
Congress also took formal steps to block the sale. On June 30, the House of 
Representatives passed a bill that disallowed the president from using federal funds to approve 
the sale of CNOOC. Since the president would not be able to approve of the purchase, the 
investment would be blocked. The bill passed easily, 398-15, receiving bipartisan support.47 
Congress would take further steps. On July 15, the Senate introduced a bill that would directly 
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prohibit CNOOC’s acquisition if the President chose not to act. On July 20, the Senate also 
passed an amendment that would require the Secretary of State to report to Congress before any 
attempted purchase of an American asset by a foreign company.48 Added to these efforts was a 
provision to the 2005 Energy Policy Act, included shortly after CNOOC withdrew its bid. This 
addition required that the secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security study the implications 
that China’s rising energy demand would have on the security of the United States.49  
Policy makers were also outspoken in the press of their opposition to CNOOC’s 
investment. Senator Ron Wyden said, “I am a free trader but being a free trader is not 
synonymous with being a chump.”  Senator Max Baucus, said, “China’s competitive challenge 
makes Americans nervous from Main Street to Wall Street, What is the Administration’s plan? 
They have none.”50  Many other policy makers expressed concern over the implications that the 
deal would have on U.S. energy security via television and radio.51 
The clearest expressions of the threat posed by CNOOC’s investment were given in a 
hearing held by the House Armed Services Committee. James Woolsey, Frank J. Gaffney, and 
Jerry Taylor provided the hearing’s testimonies. The former two were hawks who adamantly 
opposed the deal. The latter was a strict believer in free markets and openness to foreign 
investment. The hearing gives clear indications of the reasons why policy makers blocked 
CNOOC’s investment. 
Taylor attempted to convince committee members that the deal posed no threat to the 
United States. Taylor argued that Unocal was so small that the transfer of ownership would have 
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little direct effect on energy markets and U.S. energy security. He argued further, that the 
Chinese would not divert resources currently produced by Unocal since this would make little 
economic sense. Taylor’s arguments proved to be out of step with the opinions held by the 
committee members. Members from both political parties questioned his motives and his 
judgment. To them, China posed an obvious and serious threat to U.S. energy security, a problem 
that could not be mitigated by market forces.52   
Woolsey and Gaffney both offered similar testimonies. Woolsey’s main claim was that 
Taylor, and others with similar beliefs, were unable to explain Chinese behavior through 
economic theory. From the economist’s view, he argued, the deal made little sense. CNOOC was 
taking on large amounts of debt that would likely make them unprofitable for years. He believed 
that in order to understand this issue, one must understand grand strategy. China’s strategy was 
to scour the globe securing whatever energy resources it could find, especially much needed 
natural gas, to ensure its continued economic growth, and replace the United States as the global 
hegemon.53  A member of congress asked Woolsey if he would compare China’s aggressive 
foreign energy policy and grand strategy to that of Japan in 1941. Woolsey replied that Japan in 
1941 was a valid comparison. He would add that one could never trust economics because 
markets do not dictate supply - politics do. He told the committee that if a nation was to rely 
solely on market forces it could not ensure energy security.54 
The responses to the testimony of Gaffney and Woolsey were, with few exceptions, 
positive. Congressman Jim Saxton commented that blocking CNOOC’s purchase was not just a 
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matter of supply and demand, but it was about protecting the national interest.55 He could not 
understand why the United States would allow communist China to take possession of strategic 
assets. Congressman D’Amato would also echo the sentiments of the witnesses when he stated 
that the Chinese are supply driven, not price driven, and that world energy demand was likely to 
exceed supply in the next fifteen years, thus making the approval of this deal irrational.56  
Members of the Bush administration, in spite of fears of future repercussions and a 
possible trade war with one of America’s most valuable trading partners, essentially blocked 
CNOOC’s investment. In a carefully worded statement, Bush’s press secretary assured Congress 
and U.S. citizens that any deal made between Unocal and CNOOC would be the subject of a full 
CIFUS review. What this meant is that CNOOC’s purchase of Unocal would not be allowed.57  
The findings from this case confirm the hypothesis. Unocal’s assets were largely 
developed, so there was little need for technological innovation or large amounts of capital. The 
United States behaved as expected and blocked the sale since it would harm U.S. energy security 
while increasing China’s. 
Case #2: Shale Gas and Cooperation 
This section will examine U.S.-Chinese shale gas cooperation. I will begin by giving a brief 
history of shale gas in the United States. I will then explain the technological innovations that 
have made economic extraction of shale gas possible.  This is followed	  by an explanation of how 
the needs for further technological advancement and capital have pushed U.S. firms to enter into 
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joint ventures with Chinese companies. I then will explain why policy makers in the United 
States have allowed these partnerships to take place.  
Brief History of Shale Gas in the United States 
The technology that has allowed for economic shale gas extraction has had a transformative 
effect on world energy markets. It had long been recognized that natural gas trapped in shale 
rock formations could be found in abundance throughout the United States and the world. In fact, 
the first natural gas well was drilled into a shale formation in 1821 in Fredonia, New York, but 
there were few attempts to extract shale gas on a large scale. This was due to inadequate 
technology for economic extraction.  As America’s conventional resources of natural gas began 
to become increasingly scarce, the gas trapped in shale formations became more appealing to 
energy firms looking to increase productivity and reserves. In order to reach these reserves there 
would need to be a considerable amount of technological innovation.58  
One of the first men to try to develop American shale gas reserves on a large scale was 
George Mitchell, owner of Mitchell Energy and Development, a medium-sized U.S. 
independent. His began his efforts in 1982 in Texas’ Barnett shale formation. His attempts would 
prove to be difficult and costly. He would spend the next twenty years exploring, experimenting, 
and drilling, with varying degrees of success. It would not be until 2003, after Devon Energy 
bought Mitchell and introduced the combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, 
that the production of shale gas became economically viable. By this time, Devon Energy was 
the only firm that had not given up on shale gas, but with promises of new technology and 
America’s abundant supply, many companies reentered the market. Since then, there has been a 
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dramatic increase in domestic natural gas production, which many energy industry experts call 
“the shale gale.”59 
The introduction of shale gas to the American energy market has had a profound effect 
on the politics of energy. In 2007 and 2008, energy experts noticed that increased shale gas 
production had a profound impact on the natural gas market.60 Since this time, many American 
politicians have gone from worrying about scarcity and looming natural gas deficits to touting 
America as an energy superpower. This is evident in President Barrack Obama’s 2012 State of 
the Union address when he claimed that the United States is the Saudi Arabia of natural gas, 
adding that it possesses enough natural gas to supply its needs for the next 100 years.61  
The prediction of 100 years’ worth of domestic natural gas reserves comes with some 
caveats of which policy makers are aware. Currently the United States has knowledge of reserves 
and technology to produce eleven years of natural gas at the current rate of consumption. In 
order to discover and produce the remaining eighty-nine years of gas, there must be continued 
investment and technological innovation. A 2011 EIA report highlighted this information. The 
EIA report hypothesized two scenarios for shale gas recovery: a low shale gas recovery case and 
a high shale gas recovery case. The low case represents production expectations at current 
technology exploration and extraction levels. In the low recovery scenario, the United States will 
become a net gas importer by 2035.62 In spite of these major reservations, there has been 
considerable optimism for the future of America’s natural gas production by both energy-
producing firms and policy makers. This dynamic has played a pivotal role in world energy 
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politics and is a crucial variable for understanding U.S.-Chinese cooperation. If the United States 
allows Chinese investment, it will increase the pace and scope of technological development, as 
well as ensuring increased supply. If the hypothesis is correct and the United States were to cut 
off investment, it would do so at a significant cost to current and future energy security, putting it 
back in the uncomfortable position of once again being a net natural gas importer.    
Technological Advances and the Need for Further Development 
The ability to extract natural gas	  economically from shale formations has been the product of 
technological innovation in two areas. These are hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.  
These will be examined to show how the impact of technological innovation, as well as cost, has 
transformed the natural gas industry. This is followed by a discussion of the further technological 
development needed for U.S. energy firms to be able to maximize domestic resources.  
Hydraulic Fracturing 
Hydraulic fracturing is the process of pumping a high volume of fluid at a high pressure into a 
well. This creates tiny fissures in the rock surrounding the well. These fissures allow the gas to 
flow out of the rock and to the collection point at the top of the well. Ultimately, this process 
increases production to economic levels in wells that might not otherwise be considered viable. 
This process has required a significant degree of technological advancement for it to be used on 
technically complex shale formations.63 These advances have mainly been in mixing and 
blending equipment and fracturing fluid compounds.  
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 Since the first hydraulic fracturing job in 1949, the technological advances in pumping 
and blending equipment have been astounding. The equipment used to hydraulically fracture the 
first wells were capable of producing only 75 hhp.64 Currently, hydraulic fracturing equipment 
can produce over 1,500 hhp. The pump rates that higher-power pumping machines are capable of 
also significantly increased. In the 1970s, fracturing equipment was only able to achieve rates of 
two to three bbl/min.65 Currently, the minimum pump rates required to fracture shale formations 
are around one-hundred bbl/min. These increases in capacity can be attributed to the 
development, and continuing development, of specialized equipment rather than dual use 
technology employed in earlier jobs. This specialized equipment includes intensifiers, slingers, 
and manifolds.66 
 In order to fracture a shale formation properly, a precise blend of proponents needs to be 
added to the fluid. These proponents ensure proper fracture in the shale formation as well as 
keeping the fractures open after the pumping has stopped.  High-tech equipment, such as 
specialized computers and storage systems, is needed in order to ensure the proper blend. These 
technologies have been the product of extremely expensive industry-specific technological 
innovation. Without these advancements in blending equipment, fracturing fluids would not be 
nearly as precise, nor would they be nearly as effective.67 
These technological advances have made shale gas production possible. However, they 
have also had the effect of dramatically increasing the equipment costs of hydraulic fracturing 
service companies. In order for energy companies to drill	  effectively, they must now have 
millions of dollars’ worth of equipment, as well as continue spending to stay on the cutting edge 
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of the relevant technology.68 Oil and Gas service companies have been unable to absorb these 
dramatic price increases and have passed on many of the costs to the service firms with whom 
they contract. This is most clearly evidenced by the difference between the levels of research and 
development dollars invested by service companies, and those invested by oil and gas 
companies. In 2011, it is estimated that that Schlumberger, one of the largest service companies, 
spent 2.6 percent of its total revenue, respectively, on research and development. Schlumberger’s 
high levels of investment are not unusual among service companies. In the same year, 
Halliburton and Baker Hughes spent 2.4 percent and 1.7 percent of their total revenue on 
research and development. In contrast, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and Exxon Mobil, each spend less 
than 0.5 percent of their total revenue on research and development.69  
The technology involved in the production and implementation of fracturing fluid and 
proponents have also dramatically improved. Hydraulic fracturing fluid largely consists of water 
and sand. The amount of sand and water used in fracturing fluids has changed over time and has 
been the product of vast amounts of research and experimentation. The size and type of sand 
have also been heavily researched and experimented upon.70 Other products are added to the mix 
to ensure that hydraulic fracturing is done safely and effectively. These additives include acid, an 
antibacterial agent, a breaker, a clay stabilizer, a corrosion inhibitor, cross linkers, a friction 
reducer, a gelling agent, iron control, a pH adjusting agent, a scale inhibitor, and a surfactant.71 
Since each formation is unique, the amount and type of additive to be included is adjusted to 
meet the needs of specific fields.  These changes are made after experimentation in both the lab 
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and the field. Hydraulic fracturing fluid can be expected to continue to change as the industry 
learns more in the lab and has more experience in the field.72 
Horizontal Drilling 
 Horizontal drilling is the second piece to the technological puzzle presented by shale gas 
reserves. Horizontal drilling is the process of drilling down to a certain depth and then adjusting 
the drill so that it continues at an angle. Horizontal drilling’s first commercial use was in the 
early 1980s, but it was not until Devon Energy bought out Mitchell Energy in 2001 that this 
technology was used for the production of shale gas.73  
 The application of horizontal drilling was the product of a number of advances in 
directional drilling technology. These advances have allowed the drill operator to have greater 
control, as well as knowing the precise depth of the drill when it is in the ground. This has given 
the operator greater ability to more precisely change the direction of the drill, as well as allowing 
the operator to drill multiple bore holes. This allows for the precise placement of production 
equipment in the well, optimizing extraction and increasing the likelihood of successful 
drilling.74  
The ability to drill horizontally has also been the product of experimentation in the field. 
The success of the well is as dependent on the ability of the drill operator as it is on the advanced 
mechanical technology. The knowledge necessary for an operator to drill horizontally effectively 
only comes through experience and experimentation. Devon’s first attempts to apply the process 
in the Barnett Shale Formation are evidence of this. In 2002,	  the first year, they drilled 7 wells. 
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In 2003,	  the second year, they drilled 55 more wells. It was not until Devon had drilled these 
wells that the company was confident that it had the technology, process, and know-how to be 
able to economically employ this technology for large-scale shale gas production.75  
The Need for Further Technology Development 
There is an immense need for further technological development in order to assure U.S. energy 
security, as well as the economical production of shale gas. The best accounting that exists for 
this need is a report done by the National Petroleum Council Oil and Gas Study (NPC) from 
2007 titled “The Impact of Technology on Costs and Gas Recovery.” This study assesses the 
current state of unconventional gas technology as well as the areas where further technological 
development are needed. The report broke its findings up into three time spans and set specific 
technological thresholds that would be needed in order to guarantee adequate supply, keep prices 
low, and maximize domestic reserves. The three time periods are 2010, 2020, and 2030. A 
number of needed technological developments are given for each of these time frames. These 
technologies are given priority according to the level of research, development, and investment 
needed to achieve the needed innovation. The distinctions are incremental, accelerated, and 
breakthrough, with the more research intensive being the latter. The significance that each 
technology will have on shale gas production is broken into two categories: moderate and 
significant.  Of the twelve technologies that the survey found highly significant for the future of 
U.S. shale gas production, nine were in need of accelerated research and development, while six 
were in need of incremental research and development. The findings of this survey highlight the 
need to improve existing technologies, such as improvements in seismic imaging, fracturing 
fluids, and horizontal drilling techniques and equipment. The study found that there is also 
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significant technological development needing to take place by 2020. Of the 13 technological 
innovations needed by 2020, 6 of them are in need of accelerated technological development and 
one breakthrough development: real time drilling sweet spot detection. The NPC states that while 
the technological needs for 2030 are somewhat harder to predict than for 2010 or 2020, there 
needs to be significant investment made in research and development. The study predicts that of 
the technologies that are needed, two out of five technologies require accelerated research. The 
study also stresses the need for accelerated research on currently unknown technologies.76 
 The most pressing technology needs may be those that will reduce the environmental 
impacts of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. This need was not foreseen by the NPC 
study in 2007. Recent concerns raised by environmentalists and the general public have made 
addressing these issues an essential component for ensuring continued shale gas extraction. 
While shale gas producers doubt that their fluids have done any harm, the firms have taken 
action to avoid prohibitive policy actions.77 Firms are experimenting with different levels of 
additives, replacing questionable chemicals, and attempting to improve their drill casing. There 
have also been concerns about the environmental effects of hydraulic fracturing companies’ use 
of large amounts of water. Companies foresaw this issue and have been attempting to develop a 
process that can effectively recycle and reuse water, but they have yet to find their desired level 
of success. This innovation will come at the cost of continued lab research and field 
experimentation.78   
 As the data show, the ability to produce shale gas at economic rates has only been 
enabled by considerable levels of technological innovation in extraction processes and 
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capabilities. As the NPC report demonstrates, there also continues to be a need for technological 
innovation to improve recovery within existing fields, and to tap into harder-to-reach shale 
formations. If the hypothesis is correct, it should be expected that the need for high-cost 
technological innovation will push energy firms toward inter-firm cooperation. These needs will 
also create incentives for the Chinese and U.S. governments to cooperate.   
High Costs of Innovation and Drilling 
Independent companies have done much of the drilling and have accomplished much of the 
innovation in shale gas extraction. Independents usually operate on thin margins and a low cost 
base. This has allowed them to respond quickly to the rapidly changing dynamics within the 
shale gas exploration industry, but it also leaves them ill prepared to face the steep costs of 
technological research and development alone. These are costs that they continually have to pay 
to ensure production.  These firms often operate in marginal and technologically difficult 
reserves with smaller returns than those often developed by majors.79 The comparison of 
investments in exploration made by major producers and independent producers is evidence of 
this. In 2007 majors invested $49 billion in natural gas exploration, compared to the $77 billion 
invested by independents in the same year.80  These differences are due to the nature of 
independent producers. It is estimated that independent firms invest 150 percent of their net 
income back into drilling operations. Considering that these companies are much smaller than 
their major counterparts, these differences are meaningful and profound and help explain the 
need for increasing cooperation between U.S. and Chinese firms, as well as between the U.S. and 
Chinese governments. 
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An excellent example of the high cost of shale gas production is the experience of Devon 
Energy in its early work in the Barnett Shale formation.  Devon Energy drilled sixty-two wells 
before it felt confident that it had the technology in place to extract and produce shale gas 
economically on a large scale. Considering that the average price of one exploratory well is $7.6 
million and can cost as much as $15 million with a success rate of only around 40 percent, it is 
apparent that the costs of developments in exploration and production technologies are 
enormous.81 Further evidence of the dramatic increase in costs is the increase in prices as 
independents have moved from extracting conventional gas to unconventional. In 1999, the 
average cost for drilling one foot was $100. In 2006, the cost of drilling one foot had 
dramatically increased to $600. In order for firms that produce shale gas to meet the costs of 
production and technological innovation, they must rely on inter-firm alliances and 
cooperation.82  
Inter-firm Alliances and Shale Gas  
The NPC study points out that there are no accurate estimates on the amount of money invested 
in research and development.83 However, the NPC estimated through industry surveys that in the 
ten years leading up to 2007 the general trend in investment in shale gas had been downward, but 
had picked up during the year prior to the survey.84 This pick-up in investment dollars in the year 
2005-06 led to shale gas having a significant impact on energy markets in 2007-08.85 
 After 2006, investment in shale gas grew rapidly. The firms involved in shale gas 
exploration and production entered into joint ventures to explore and develop shale formations 
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throughout the United States. These ventures included agreements between a number of U.S. and 
international firms. The reasons cited for these joint ventures within the industry are to share 
costs as well as reduce research and development redundancies. Another reason cited by those in 
the industry is that collaboration offsets the high costs of gaining experience. By entering into 
inter-firm alliances, firms are able to take advantage of skills already acquired by their partner. In 
2010, mergers and acquisitions in the energy production sector - mainly consisting of limited 
partnerships – amounted to over $465 billion. This number represented 21 percent of all mergers 
and acquisitions in all sectors, and was 32 percent larger than the number for 2009. Although not 
all of these deals involved shale gas, this resource was a popular target for firms looking to 
expand their operations.86 
U.S. and Chinese Inter-Firm Cooperation 
In 2010, Chinese companies began to enter into inter-firm alliances with U.S. energy companies. 
The first deal between CNOOC and Chesapeake Energy was in 2010 and was worth   $2.2 
billion. The deal granted CNOOC a one-third stake in the Eagle-Ford shale formation in 
Southwest Texas. Chesapeake and CNOOC agreed that their goal for the Eagle-Ford formation 
was to increase the number of drilling rigs in operation from ten to forty.	  Conditions of the 
agreement included CNOOC agreeing to provide the capital and technical expertise for a 
significant portion of the expansion.87  
 CNOOC and Chesapeake followed this deal with another similar deal for shale acreage in 
Wyoming and Colorado in January 2011. Industry analysts thought that this deal was made 
primarily for technology collaboration and transfer. CNOOC sought to improve its ability to tap 
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into reserves of natural gas in China. The ability to do so will help supply China’s rapidly 
increasing demand for energy resources. Chesapeake entered the deal looking to reduce its debt 
level, raise capital, and take advantage of technological collaboration.88  
 Chinese and American firms have made two other deals. In January 2012, Devon Energy 
announced that it would sell a share of its shale operations to Sinopec for $900 million in cash 
and $1.2 billion in future drilling costs. Devon Energy cited reasons for making the deal as the 
recovery of drilling and land acquisition costs, as well as reducing future capital commitments.89 
Chinese firms have also sought to purchase U.S. shale technology firms. The most noteworthy of 
these deals is the competition between CNOOC and Sinopec to purchase a one-third share in the 
hydraulic fracturing technology company Frac Tech Holdings. Frac Tech Holdings is a 
collaborative enterprise. It is owned jointly by Chesapeake Energy (30%) and the sovereign 
wealth funds of China and Abu Dhabi (70%).  Chinese investment and U.S. firms’ willingness to 
allow it are evidence of the desire for increased research and development.90 
Why Chinese Investment 
As mentioned above, there have been many mergers in the energy industry worldwide.  The 
Chinese firms were especially active. For example, the three largest Chinese energy firms spent 
$24 billion in 2010 and $18.5 billion in 2011 to acquire stakes in foreign energy assets. A 
number of these partnerships were attempts to gain the shale gas extraction technology 
developed in the United States. Chinese companies have made these investments in an effort to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
88 Leslie Hook, “Cnooc Strikes Second US Shale Deal,” Financial Times, January, 31, 2011.  
89 Azam Ahmed, “Sinopec and Total Continue Shale Gas Buying Spree,” New York Times, January, 3 2012. 
90 Dinny McMahon and Chester Yung, “China’s Bid in Fracking,” Wall Street Journal, December, 16 2011. 	  
42	  
	  
acquire American firms’ shale gas technology. Chinese firms desire this technology so that they 
can begin to extract gas from China’s large shale reserves.91  
 The American energy companies that have made these deals with Chinese companies are 
independents. Independents need large amounts of capital to ensure current operations, continue 
exploration, and further development. Since independents often run operations on thin margins, 
they are in constant need of money. This has been especially true for the major players in shale 
gas production, Chesapeake and Devon Energy. Capital from western investors has been 
especially hard to acquire. This is due to the lingering effects of the 2008 recession, as well as 
lower gas prices in the United States.92 China has a large amount of capital and considerable 
incentives beyond profit to continue investing in shale assets.  This is due to a number of factors. 
China has been the beneficiary of a large trade surplus with the United States which has allowed 
it to accumulate hundreds of billions of dollars. For example, in 2010 it held $2.5 trillion in 
foreign currency. This has permitted the Chinese government to make large loans on favorable 
terms to its energy firms. These loans allow China to invest its large cash reserves in more 
tangible energy assets.93More importantly, however, investment in U.S. shale gas producers has 
the added benefit of further securing Chinese future energy security. China has an estimated 
1,275 tfc of technically recoverable shale gas within its national borders. Because of this 
incentive Chinese companies have continued to invest in U.S. shale gas resources, even though 
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natural gas prices have been low. This investment by Chinese firms, however, is just as much, if 
not more, about technology transfer as it is about profits.94  
U.S. Political Reaction to Chinese Investment and Cooperation 
U.S. policy makers’ reactions to Chinese firms’ involvement in U.S domestic shale gas 
production have largely been positive. There is general recognition that in order for the United 
States to ensure energy security it must invite investment that pushes technological innovation 
forward, as well as reducing Chinese demand for foreign energy products. Policy makers have 
acknowledged that this is best done by helping China obtain the required technology to tap into 
its own large domestic reserves.95  
This enthusiasm has led the United States to cooperate with China on a number of fronts 
in the hope of increased production and reduced resource competition. In 2007, the United States 
Trade and Development Agency began instruction of a class that brings Chinese and U.S. energy 
professionals together. The stated purpose of the course was to “strengthen industry cooperation 
and technical collaboration between U.S. and China government and private sector entities in the 
area of natural gas development.”96 In 2009, U.S. President Barrack Obama and Chinese 
president Hu Jintao also initiated the U.S.-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative. The goal of this 
initiative is to share shale gas technology, collaborate on future technology projects, and open up 
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both countries for mutual shale gas investment.97 This is further evidence of policy makers’ 
recognition of the importance of Chinese investment and technological collaboration. 
Washington was almost entirely silent about the three shale gas deals made between 
Chinese and U.S. companies. Policy makers have yet to raise concerns about the threat posed by 
Chinese shale gas investment. Tellingly, before the Eagle Ford Shale venture between CNOOC 
and Chesapeake in 2010, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States precleared 
the deal.98 The two other joint ventures entered into by Chinese and American companies 
received similar treatment. There has likewise been nothing said about two Chinese companies 
being the only bidders for a one-third share of a U.S. shale gas technology company. Policy 
makers have remained silent because Chinese firms’ investments promise to improve U.S. 
energy security. 
Increasing cooperation between the United States and China provides support for the 
hypothesis. U.S. policy makers have been open to investment from Chinese companies since the 
benefits of allowing investment significantly outweigh the costs. Allowing for Chinese 
investment and technological collaboration on domestic projects is the best way for policy 
makers to secure adequate energy supplies. This is true for a number of reasons. By not allowing 
Chinese capital, policy makers would be cutting off U.S. energy firms from opportunities for 
technological collaboration, as well as limiting opportunities for capital acquisition. This would 
limit the ability of most energy producing firms to start new projects and extract more 
technologically difficult shale resources. If these firms were unable to undertake these activities, 
it would jeopardize U.S. energy security. The U.S. would have the assets in the ground but 
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would not be able to extract them economically and bring them to market. This would force the 
United States to aggressively seek less reliable imports from foreign energy producers and would 
decrease energy security.  
Conclusion 
After introducing the independent variables of the hypothesis, the need for high levels of 
technological development and capital offer a compelling explanation for the change in U.S. 
policy toward Chinese energy investment from 2005 to the present. This helps support the 
hypothesis that this research set out to test: For an energy project, if technological intensity and 
capital intensity are high, it is likely U.S. policy makers will support cooperation and allow for 
foreign investment.  
According to the findings of this research, Chinese investment and U.S. energy producers 
capital requirements can be expected to grow as energy firms move from the more easily 
accessible shale formations to more difficult ones. This investment is also most likely to continue 
to come from China. Chinese companies have more to gain than any other investor since such 
collaboration has the potential to help them develop their own substantial energy assets.	  Since 
Chinese firms have motives beyond profit making they are more likely than other firms to 
continue investment in the face of low prices. As natural gas continues to be developed, it has 
had the effect of depressing the market price since supply has exceeded domestic demand. U.S. 
policy makers can be expected to continue to allow investment to the point that it offers the 
potential for further energy security.   
The findings of this research and the implications of the hypothesis are somewhat limited 
in the scope of applicability to cases not directly related to the United States and China. There 
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are few other states with both the capability to aggressively seek energy resources and the need 
to do so. For the United States and China resource extraction is a zero-sum game. Both countries 
have, and continue to face, large energy deficits. Other countries that face comparable deficits do 
not have energy firms within their borders with the capital or technological knowledge to 
aggressively seek foreign resource assets. These findings are also limited in their ability to 
continue to predict U.S. policy makers’ behavior if large scale LNG exporting capabilities are 
built in the United States.  Under this scenario, the incentives for policy makers change, but the 
response should continue to be towards openness to Chinese investment to the point that the 
energy security gained through Chinese investment significantly outweighs the loss from 
exported LNG. 
 There is a significant need for further research using this model. If the hypothesis is 
correct, it should be able to explain and predict current and future U.S.-Chinese energy 
cooperation in other energy projects that have high entry costs and the need for significant 
technological development for long-term economic extraction. Further research will need to look 
at other unconventional resource extraction methods such off shore drilling, coal gasification, 
and shale oil exploration. Since each of these three methods of resource extraction has high entry 
costs and requires significant amounts of technology, based on the findings outlined by this 
research, it should be expected that these areas of fossil fuel exploration should encourage 
cooperation.               
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